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IN BRIEF 
The protection of civilians and their property in war is an accepted norm of international law 
- even where the putatively {{noncombatant" populace openly supports the immoral use of 
force by its military. NATO's Kosovo operation suggests, however, that the imposition of 
hardship on the sentient, adult {{noncombatant" population through property loss can erode a 
society's appetite for malevolence. While civilians should not be targeted, a new paradigm for 
noncombatancy that allows the destruction of certain property currently protected by 
international law but not absolutely indispensable to civilian survival may well help shorten 
conflict and effect necessary societal change. 
I f recent press reports about the Kosovo air campaign in the spring of 1999 are to be believed, the Milosevic regime yielded 
not because its fielded forces were defeated, 
but because of the impact of the bombing on the 
Serb people. 1 According to reports, the air 
strikes gradually reduced many Yugoslav civil-
ians to "caveman" status. 2 The record shows 
the progressive imposition of that condition 
coincided precisely with the sought-after break-
down of Serb resistance. Yet such bombings 
are troubling to some.3 Ifthey were aimed pri-
marily at adversely affecting noncombatants 
(as opposed to diminishing actual military 
1. See e.g., John Barry and Evan Thomas, The Kosovo 
Couer-up, Newsweek, May 15, 2000, pp. 22, 24. (''Air power 
was effective in the Kosovo war not against military tar-
gets but against civilian ones .... Making the Serb populace 
suffer ... threatened [Milosovic's] hold.") 
2. Just days before the Serbs yielded to NATO, former 
President Jimmy Carter complained that "Serbian citi-
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capability), they seem at odds with the com-
mon understanding of legal and ethical war-
making that seeks to spare civilians the effects 
of the use of force. A new paradigm for non-
combatancy may be in order for the post-
Kosovo era. 
Noncombatants and Moral Innocence 
A conceptual anomaly arises from the fact 
that the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is 
much more generous in the protections it 
affords civilians than many nonspecialists 
intuitively consider appropriate. Today LOAC 
zens report they are living like cavemen, and their tor-
ment increases daily." Jimmy Carter, "Have We Forgotten 
The Path To Peace?," New York Times, May 27,1999. This 
news item and others for this article, see Department of 
Defense, Current News Early Bird, at http://ebird.dtic.mil. 
3. See Charles Truehart, "War Crimes Court Looking at 
NATO," Washington Post, December 29, 1999, p. A20. 
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does not, for example, attempt to determine 
moral culpability when assigning noncombat-
ant status. Indeed, many of those protected 
as "noncombatants" by international law as it 
has evolved over the years have unmistakable 
moral responsibility. In War & Law Since 1945 
Geoffrey Best notes that the "idea of the non-
combatant shifted" over the years. Where once 
the law sought to protect "a person who formed 
no part of an enemy country's armed strength 
and made no contribution to it," it now extends 
coverage to all those not formally part of a mil-
itary organization. He further observes that 
"this legal development is not without moral 
and political difficulties. It has produced rules 
of law which may not correspond with the 
moral and political realities of societies in 
armed conflict."4 
Best's concerns about moral accountability 
as it relates to LOACis especially well-founded 
in cases where force is required to deal with 
societies psychologically disposed to champion 
ethnic cleansing and similarly maniacal behav-
ior by their militaries. Furthermore, unlike 
the situation existing when noncombatant sta-
tus originated, civilians in developed societies 
do, as Best might put it, very often "contribute" 
to the country's armed strength in ways not 
extant just a few decades ago. The growing 
dependence of today's militaries on civilian 
systems necessary to support high-technology 
war makes this SO,5 as does the fact that in 
modern - and relatively modern - nations, 
the need for popular support in order to project 
force is an accepted fact of political life. 
Americans find ascribing culpability to the 
enemy citizenry disconcerting. The reflexive 
desire to absolve the supporting populace res-
onates in the mantra of u.s. politicians of 
recent years: "America's fight is not with the 
_ people, it is with their leader." Regrettably, 
this thesis is often flawed, and was plainly 
wrong as applied to Slobodan Milosevic and 
his countrymen. In an insightful essay in the 
New York Times, Anthony Lewis wrote: 
4. Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994; paperback ed. 1997), pp. 258-259. 
5. See Michael N. Schmitt, "Bellum Americanum: The 
U.S. View of Twenty-first Century War and Its Possible 
Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict," Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No.4., p. 1068-69. 
6. Anthony Lewis, "The Question of Evil," New York 
Times, June 22, 1999. 
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Slobodan Milosevic is not the only author 
of the war crimes in Kosovo. Thousands of 
Serbs were involved. And hundreds of thou-
sands more back in Serbia proper were fixed 
in the belief that the Serbs had done no 
wrong. They were subjected to Milosevic 
propaganda, yes. But even when told of Serb 
atrocities in Kosovo, they argued that the 
Serbs were only replying - they were the 
real victims.6 
In such cases ''America's fight" - contrary to 
the politician's paean - is, in fact, with the 
"people" in those societies that countenance 
and support murderous conduct. Samuel 
Huntington, in his perceptive book, The Clash 
of Civilizations, predicted the U.S. may well 
find itself in contests with civilizations that 
do not share its values. 7 That Americans find 
this so inexplicable is partly the result of cul-
tural arrogance - the idea that whole soci-
eties could reject the U.S. Weltanschauung is 
foreign to the American psyche - and partly 
out of an almost inexplicably innocent naivete. 
Daniel Boorstin tells us Americans suffer from 
"Myths of Popular Innocence" - the illusion 
that adversary populations are helpless vic-
tims of cruel leaders. 8 In truth, this is seldom 
the case even when the leaders are, indeed, 
ruthless autocrats. Boorstin points out that 
despite the existence of a powerful military 
backed by an extensive internal security appa-
ratus, the Soviet empire collapsed with nary a 
shot fired once the popular will evinced an 
unmistakable desire for change. 
In short, Americans like to believe others 
think much as they do and that the whole 
world aspires to their same values. The sad 
fact is that this just is not true. In Kosovo, the 
unpleasant reality is that many Serbs were 
willing supporters of Milosevic's policies, if not 
of the man himself.9 True, Serb propaganda 
provoked ethnic hatred, and this may have 
explained the attitudes of rural and unedu-
cated Yugoslavs. But that does not explain -
7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and 
The Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & 
Shuster, 1996). 
8. Daniel J. Boorstin, "Myths of Popular Innocence," US. 
News & World Report, March 4, 1991, p. 41. 
9. See e.g., Eve-Ann Prentice, "Serbs Unmoved By 
Kosovans' Anguish," London Times, May 26, 1999. 
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as the Wall Street Journal notes, the behav-
ior of "the Serbian intelligentsia - the uni-
versity professors, journalists, potentates of 
the Orthodox Church and other cognoscenti 
who knew better but kept silent .... "10 
Influencing Mass Psychology 
Thoughtful military strategists readily 
appreciate that successfully influencing the 
psychology of the masses can clear a path to 
victory. War is not - as many Americans and 
others are wont to believe - merely a process 
of destroying an enemy's military artifacts. In 
war properly conceived, the real battlefield is 
the human mind. The great military theorist 
Carl von Clausewitz taught that war is an act 
intended "to compel our enemy to do our will." 
Clausewitz further maintained that the people, 
the government, and the military formed a 
. "remarkable trinity" essential to waging war.ll 
Disassembling that trinity has been a goal of 
Clausewitzeans for generations because it . 
results in the collapse of an opponent's abil-
ity to continue to fight. 
Airpower thinkers - beginning with Giulio 
Douhet in his classic Command of the Air -
have long sought to use the air weapon to do 
the dismembering. 12 Warplanes can strike 
directly at an enemy's heart by overflying his 
military forces and attacking his homeland in 
order to sever the people from their govern-
ment and military. To some, however, the 
resiliency of the German population during 
World War II air bombardments, as well as 
that of the Japanese people, disproved the 
theories of Douhet and his adherents. 
This criticism is valid only to the degree to 
which it is qualified by several facts. 
Specifically, the conventional munitions of 
World War II were not as potent as Douhet's 
theory required; the ability of totalitarian 
regimes of the 1940s to persevere in the face of 
air attack was greater than Douhet's concept 
foresaw; and air defenses proved to be much 
10. "Deconstructing Serbia," The Wall Street Journal 
Europe, June 22, 1999. See also Mark J. Osiel, Obeying 
Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline & the Law of War 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), p. 66. 
("Most Serbian officers, and even many Serbian enlisted 
personnel, had good reason to know that the war their 
superiors ordered them to wage was aggressive in nature.") 
11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret, ed., and trans. 1976) (1832), p. 75. Clausewitz 
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more capable vis-a.-vis the era's bombers than 
Douhet anticipated. But Douhet was ahead of 
his time. Among other things, he expected the 
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-
poison gas in specific - in air attacks against 
urban populations in order to break the people's 
will. 13 Japan's collapse after the destruction of 
just two of its cities by air-delivered WMD is 
more indicative of the validity of Douhet's 
theories than any other comparison. 
The air weapon should be unleashed 
against entirely new categories of 
property that current conceptions of 
Law of Armed Conflict put off-limits. 
Most importantly - and this is critical to 
the future use of the air weapon - until 
Kosovo Douhet's theories were never tested 
using to day's enormously destructive and inge-
niously targetable conventional munitions, 
and never against the psychology of a mod-
ernizing, acquisitive, semi-cosmopolitan soci-
ety dressed in quasi-democratic institutions 
and processes. This was much the situation, 
however, that American military officers found 
in Serbia at the start of the campaign. If the 
consequences of war could be brought to the 
Yugoslav public, the Serbs themselves would 
pressure Milosevic to yield or remove him 
entirely.14 The difficulty was that existing LOAC 
rules - not to mention ethical constraints -
prohibited directly targeting noncombatants 
and noncombatant objects. 
The indirect effects of orthodox attacks on 
dual-use infrastructure (that is, infrastruc-
ture used by both civilians and military forces) 
could, however, have the desired impact. 
Targeting infrastructure is consistent with 
LOAC so long as the direct and concrete mil-
itary advantage sought outweighs expected 
collateral losses to noncombatants and their 
held that war is a "remarkable trinity" composed ofthe 
people, the military, and the government, p. 89. 
12. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (New York: 
Coward-McCann, 1942; reprinted Washington, DC: Office 
of Air Force History, 1983). 
13. Ibid., p. 58. 
14. See e.g., Rowan Scarborough, "Civilian Deaths Must 
Be Expected, NATO Says," Washington Times, June 2, 








property. Even with those 
limitations, the indirect 
effect of the bombing on the 
psychology of the civilian 
population seemed well 
We must not hesitate 
refrigerators weren't 
running, there was no 
water in their kitchens 
or bathrooms, no lights, to demonize the demons. 
understood. Consider the 
assault on Serbia's power grid. The Washington 
Post reported on May 25, 1999 that although 
NATO officially insisted that attacks on the 
power grid were intended to disrupt the 
Yugoslav military, "senior allied military offi-
cials acknowledged that they also wanted to 
damage the quality of everyday life so that 
suffering citizens will start questioning the 
intransigence of their politicalleadership."15 
It appears this strategy worked, as Thomas 
L. Friedman related in the New York Times: 
As the Pentagon will tell you, airpower alone 
brought this war to a close in 78 days for 
one reason - not because NATO made life 
impossible for Serb troops in Kosovo (look 
how much armor they drove out of there), 
but because NATO made life miserable for 
the Serb civilians in Belgrade. 16 
Following the conflict, Airman magazine, 
an official publication of the U.S. Air Force, 
published the following comments by the senior 
Air Force commander during the campaign: 
''As an airman, I would have targeted the 
power grid, bridges and military head-
quarters in and around Belgrade the first 
day ofthe conflict," said [the commander], 
who believes that's what eventually brought 
Milosevic to his knees. ''Air power is made for 
shock value." 
"Just think if after the first day, the 
Serbian people had awakened and their 
15. Phillip Bennett and Steve ColI, "NATO Warplanes 
Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid," Washington Post, May 25, 
1999, p. 1. 
16. Thomas L. Friedman, "Was Kosovo World War III?," 
New York Times, July 2, 1999. 
17. As quoted by MSgt Tim Barela in "To Win a War," 
Airman, September 1999, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added). 
These are essentially the same points reported earlier 
by the Washington Post. See William Drozdiak, '~r War 
Commander Says Kosovo Victory Near" Washington Post, 
May 24,1999, p. 1. 
18. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff insists that 
"[e]very target struck was a military-related target .... " 
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no transportation sys-
tem to get to work, and 
five or six military headquarters in Belgrade 
had disappeared, they would have asked: 
'All this after the first night? What is the 
rest ofthis [conflict] going to be like?' "17 
Although the actual attacks conducted 
against Serbia's infrastructure appear justi-
fied as bona fide efforts to reduce the effec-
tiveness of military facilities and military 
equipment/communications,18 the comman-
der's hypothetical in Airman about infra-
structure attacks does illustrate the compli-
cations of LOAC. Destroying infrastructure in 
order to deny noncombatants an indispens-
able necessity of life like drinking water, to 
make their bathrooms and sewage systems 
waterless and unworkable, to leave them in 
wartime without refrigeration for their food, 
and to deny them transportation without 
regard to the nature of their work, is not the 
kind of attack LOAC ordinarily allows. 19 In 
other words, attacks for the sole purpose of 
eroding noncombatant life support systems 
are prohibited. This is not to say, however, 
that noncombatants cannot be inconvenienced 
or denied luxuries or, for that matter, have 
their political will be made a target. But doing 
so, as Yves Sandoz of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross observes, is dif-
ficult under today's legal regime because 
defining the "military advantage when the 
aim of the operation is to weaken the enemy 
so as to make him surrender" is quite prob-
lematic. 20 
General Hugh H. Shelton, "Kosovo: Joint Chiefs 
Chairman Disagrees," Christian Science Monitor, July 
12, 1999. See also, Michael Ignatieff, "The Virtual 
Commander," The New Yorker, August 2, 1999, pp. 31, 
35. 
19. Article 54, 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts, 
June 8, 1977, makes it prohibited "to attack, destroy, 
remove or render useless objects indispensable for the 
survival of the civilian population" for "any motive." 
20. Yves Sandoz, "Beware, The Geneva Conventions Are 
Under Fire," International Herald Tribune, July 14,1999. 
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While the various rationales for avoiding 
dual-use infrastructure attacks are usually 
readily understandable, the reasoning against 
striking other kinds of civilian objects is rather 
less clear. Under the current Law of Armed 
Conflict, a civilian object exempt from attack 
is everything that is not a "military objec-
tive." Military objectives "are limited to those 
objects which by their nature, location, pur-
pose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture and neutralization, in 
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers 
a definite military advantage."21 Under these 
limitations, personal property is a category 
of civilian "objects" seldom subject to legiti-
mate attack. This rule can create curious sit-
uations. 
During the Kosovo campaign the press 
reported an alleged plan for a computer-based 
strike on Milosevic's personal bank accounts.22 
Later stories indicated that legal concerns 
were one reason the cyberassault was 
aborted. 23 If such a plan existed, the legal 
issues might include the fact that absent a 
showing, for example, that the monies are 
being used to directly support a military 
effort, LOAC would not permit raiding 
Milosevic's personal accounts. To many the 
prohibitions against such attacks - espe-
cially where "bloodless" cyberwar techniques 
are used - are nonsensical. Cyberwar expert 
Don Stauffer, noting the unintended con-
sequences on civilians of bombing campaigns 
aimed at traditional targets, makes the 
obvious point: "Surely hurting a civilian's 
pocketbook is more ethical than bombing 
him."24 This observation is particularly apt 
as civilian leaders who serve as commanders 
in chief of their armed forces --'-- like Milosevic 
- are legitimate targets themselves, although 
- paradoxically - their personal property 
is not. 
21. The general protection of civilian objects was codi-
fied in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
June 8, 1977, chapter III. While the U.S. has not rati-
fied Additional Protocol I, this portion is considered part 
of customary international law. 
22. See e.g., Gregory L. Vistica, "Cyberwar and Sabotage," 
Newsweek, May 31, 1999, p. 38. 
23. See William Arkin, "Cyber Bomb in Yugoslavia," 
Washington Post (Electronic Edition), October 25, 1999, 
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Toward a New Paradigm 
Should LOAC continue to bar the deliber-
ate destruction of civilian property? Should 
the bar apply even when the destruction is 
aimed at eroding a society's appetite to do the 
unconscionable against the helpless? In an 
intriguing new book, The Soul of Battle, clas-
sics professor Victor Davis Hanson suggests 
modern democracies should "rethink what con-
stitutes real brutality in war and who are the 
real peace-makers."25 In coming to this con-
clusion Hanson examines three great cam-
paigns against tyrannical "cultures of slav-
ery": Epaminodas' destruction of Spartan mil-
itarism, William Tecumseh Sherman's 
bludgeoning of the heart of the Confederacy, 
and George Patton's race into Germany that 
smashed Nazism. Hanson points out that after 
"the terrible marches of retribution into their 
country, none of these cultures of slavery would 
field a credible army again."26 
When societies propagate evil, 
democracies must be prepared to visit 
upon them force so staggering it will 
produce fundamental change. 
Professor Hanson sees these three cam-
paigns in stark terms of virtuous crusades of 
democratic armies against morally flawed soci-
eties. The genius of these operations, Hanson 
contends, is that the democratic warriors swept 
into hostile territory to destroy the spirit rather 
than the bodies of their enemy. Although the 
property damage inflicted upon the enemy's 
territory in each case was immense, there were 
relatively few casualties on either side. Hanson 
insists a "democratic nation in arms must 
at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationalldotmill 
arkin.htm, and Bradley Graham, "Military Grappling 
With Rules For Cyber Warfare," Washington Post, 
November 8,1999, p. 1. 
24. Don Stauffer, "Electronic Warfare: Battles Without 
Bloodshed," The Futurist, January-February 2000, p. 26. 
25. Victor Davis Hanson, The Soul of Battle: From Ancient 
Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators 
Vanquished Tyranny (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 
p.405. 
26. Hanson, p. 406. 
13 
make the entire society of the enemy pay for 
the aggression of its army [and] must convince 
his own democratic army that they are morally 
superior to the enemy."27 He argues the lesson 
for democratic societies today is that, in the 
end, there "must be a choice between good and 
evil, that the real immorality is not the use of 
great force to inflict punishment, but ... the fail-
ure to exercise moral authority at all."28 
Hanson's thesis may suggest a strategy for 
the use of force in the future. Specifically, when 
facing a society whose moral compass is wildly 
askew, it may well behoove democracies to con-
sider a similarly sweeping campaign against 
property - despite its terrible destructive-
ness. In other words, use ruinous force not 
upon people (to even include combatants if 
possible), but upon objects. Although Hanson 
envisions a physical invasion of an enemy's 
territory as necessary to induce a cultural 
change on an amoral enemy, there may well 
be application to the air weapon, if its full 
potential is realized. 
We need a new paradigm when using force 
against societies with malevolent propensi-
ties. We must hold at risk the very way oflife 
that sustains their depredations, and we must 
threaten to destroy the world as they know it 
if they persist. This means the air weapon 
should be unleashed against entirely new cat-
egories of property that current conceptions 
of LOAC put off-limits. As the Kosovo cam-
paign demonstrates, striking from the air is 
today the safest and most effective way for the 
U.S. to use force because it exploits the asym-
metric warfighting advantage it enjoys over 
every military in the world. American air power 
today is virtually unstoppable. Furthermore, 
technologies now available to U.S. airmen allow 
tremendous destructive power to be applied 
discretely and efficiently against a wide range 
of objects that opportunistic, materialistic soci-
eties like Yugoslavia value. 
What kind of civilian objects would be added 
to target lists? None that are genuinely indis-
pensable to the survival of the noncombatant 
population. Not struck, for example, would be 
many of the infrastructure targets suggested 
in the Airman magazine article. However, 
almost everything else of any value would be 
fair game. The new target sets would include 
27. Hanson, p. 33. 
28. Hanson, p. 412. 
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such things as banks and financial institu-
tions. Factories, plants, stores, and shops that 
produce, sell, or distribute luxury products or, 
indeed, anything not absolutely indispensable 
to noncombatant survival, might be wonder-
fully rewarding targets - as could be their 
associated logistics systems. Reducing the 
middle and upper classes to a subsistence level 
through the destruction of access to all but 
essential goods might pressure the very groups 
best positioned to effect the desired change. 
Additional targets under this proposal could 
include selected cultural, educational, and his-
torical sites whose existence provides support 
- to include psychological sustenance - to 
the malignant ideology that stimulates the 
behavior the use of force is intended to stop. 
Furthermore, resorts, along with other enter-
tainment, sports, and recreational facilities 
could be slated for destruction. Of course, gov-
ernment offices and buildings of every kind 
would be subject to eradication, even if they 
do not directly support military activities 
(except those whose destruction would seri-
ously impede the delivery of services indis-
pensable for noncombatant survival). Finally, 
to the extent it is feasible to do so, the per-
sonal property of the sentient, adult popula-
tion ought to be held at risk so long as it is 
not, again, indispensable to human survival. 
Milosevic's bank accounts would be high on 
the target list under the revised model. 
This proposal openly acknowledges an intent 
to inflict hardship upon the sentient, adult, 
(albeit putatively noncombatant) populace who 
must be held responsible for the deeds of their 
military forces. It includes even those who may 
oppose their government's policies. Given the 
tremendous scale of atrocities that are infect-
ing the modern world, not to mention the glob-
alization of WMD technology, ethical norms 
should place an affirmative duty on a nation's 
citizenry to actively frustrate their govern-
ment's actions when they become patently 
inhumane. James W. Child points out "people 
have a duty to restrain their government from 
committing nuclear aggression and if they fail 
in that duty, their absolute immunity as non-
combatants is undermined."29 Much the same 
can be said when abuses on the scale of a 
Kosovo occur, at least insofar as the immunity 
29. James W Child, Nuclear War: The Moral Dimension 
(Somerset, NJ: Transaction, 1986), pp. 171-172. 
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currently enjoyed by civilian objects is con-
cerned. If enemy publics fail to restrain their 
governments - notwithstanding it may require 
them to place their moral responsibility above 
their personal safety - then they must for-
feit their claim to the quality of life civilian 
objects provide. 
Nevertheless, the proposal recognizes that 
the wholesale destruction of civilian property 
not necessary for human survival may still 
unintentionally impose distress upon those 
truly innocent such as children, the infirm, 
and the insane. Realistically, this unfortunate 
predicament cannot be completely avoided, 
but efforts must be made to minimize it. 
Accordingly, in order to lessen unintended con-
sequences, certain limits need to be put in place: 
a) The attacks should only be conducted in 
those circumstances where the intended effect 
of undermining the will of the people appears 
to have a reasonable likelihood of success. Not 
all societies are necessarily vulnerable to a 
strategy that destroys objects as opposed to 
people. Particular adversaries may be indif-
ferent to property loss, or have nothing of value 
to destroy. 
b) The attacks must not be for the purpose, 
per se, of punishment for punishment's sake, 
but rather for the purpose of eviscerating the 
disposition of the adversary to conduct objec-
tionable activities. 
c) The attacks should be preceded by clear 
warnings, if possible, and be accompanied by 
an extremely aggressive information campaign 
that unambiguously sets forth the rationale 
for the attacks, as well as the actions needed to 
terminate them. 
d) Civilian safe areas and evacuation routes 
should be designated whenever possible, and 
medical or religious facilities must not be tar-
geted unless they are actually being used for 
military purposes. Steps must also be taken 
to provide subsistence for enemy noncombat-
ants when necessary. 
e) The scope and severity of the attacks must 
bear a reasonable relationship to the egre-
30. By May 25, 1999, CNN was reporting that 82% of 
Americans favored a suspension of the airstrikes. See 
Keating Holland, "Americans Want Temporary Halt to 
Airstrikes," May 25,1999, at http://cnn.comlALLPOLI-
TICS/stories/1999/05/25/poll!. In the same poll, the per-
centage of Americans favoring U.S. participation in the 
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giousness of the conduct sought to be pre-
vented, and the level of force necessary to 
purge the enemy society of its perverse beliefs. 
Under the current Law of Armed 
Conflict, a civilian object exempt from 
attack is everything that is not a 
"military objective." 
This proposal does not endorse infrastructure 
attacks intended solely to deny the civilian 
population water, power, and other indis-
pensable necessities of life because, in addi-
tion to ethical and legal concerns, such strikes 
can be militarily counter-productive. Whatever 
tolerance the American public may have for 
the destruction of property, it does not appear 
to extend to acts that kill noncombatants, even 
unintentionally. In this regard it is instruc-
tive to note that mounting reports of civilian 
casualties during the Yugoslav conflict paral-
leled a progressive drop in public support for 
the air campaign.30 From a frankly Machiavel-
lian perspective, scenes of enemy noncombat-
ants dying from the effects of infrastructure 
loss would undermine the ability of a democ-
racy to make war. 
Additionally, the proposal must not be con-
fused with the kind of indiscriminate bomb-
ing campaign the Russians are reported to 
have conducted in Chechnya. There, objects 
indispensable to noncombatant survival appar-
ently were destroyed, and many civilians 
trapped in battle areas were killed. Nor should 
it be confused with "bomb them back to the 
Stone Age" efforts apocryphally attributed to 
Vietnam-era strategies. Both approaches vio-
late the proposal's central principle that calls 
for discrimination between objects that are 
indispensable to noncombatants, and property 
superfluous to human survival. Furthermore, 
as already suggested, imposing massive prop-
erty loss will only have a positive effect on 
airstrikesfell from 61% on 15 April to 49%. For details 
of the earlier poll see Keating Holland, "Support for 
NATO strikes, and ground troops growing," April 15, 
1999, at http://cnn.comlALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/ 
04/15ikosovo. poll!. 
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accumulative, wealth-oriented nations with 
assets to lose, and those societies accustomed 
to - or desirous of - the benefits of modernity. 
bello ordinarily makes no judgments as to the 
moral rectitude of any belligerent. Proponents 
of this concept maintain that if the rule were 
that the morally 
Conclusion The new target sets would include 
"wrong" side was 
unworthy of the 
protection of LOAC, 
then all war would 
quickly escalate 
without constraints 
as each party 
believes it and it 
alone has the moral 
high ground. 
Regrettably, the 
logic behind jus in 
bello simply has not 
It is, of course, trou-
bling to anyone con-
cerned with the ethi-
cal conduct of war to 
acquiesce to what 
seems to be a retreat 
from a carefully con-
structed legal archi-
tecture aimed at 
diminishing war's hor-
ror. Nevertheless, evo-
lutions in accepted 
such things as banks and financial 
institutions. Factories, plants, stores, 
and shops that produce, sell, or 
distribute luxury products or, indeed, 
anything not absolutely indispensable 
to noncombatant survival, might be 
wonderfully rewarding targets. 
norms do occur in 
LOAC from time to time, as they do in other 
areas of international law. From a moral per-
spective a change that seeks to replace the 
killing of people with the destruction of objects 
would seem to represent a positive step toward 
reducing human suffering in armed conflicts. 
Some will contend the massive destruction 
of property will simply create deep-seated bit-
terness that will plant the seeds of future con-
flict. Despite a certain logic of the contention, 
experience demonstrates a fearful truth: that 
such will only occur if the destruction is inap-
propriately tempered. Consider that the mas-
sive destruction of Germany and Japan during 
World War II allowed the necessary physical 
and psychological reconstruction to begin 
cleanly from "bare metal" with the help of the 
U.S. and others. Importantly, the devastation 
inflicted - much of it upon irreplaceable objects 
- did not result in embittered societies bid-
ing time to wreak revenge. To the contrary, 
the millennium-old militaristic instincts of 
both a great Asian power and its European 
counterpart were uprooted in little more than 
a generation to be replaced by near pacifism. 
The hideous fascisim of both cultures is now 
only an embarrassing memory. 
It is fair to say that aiming to destroy non-
combatant property as discussed above rep-
resents a significant departure from a basic 
premise of LOAC, that is, the idea that jus in 
31. See e.g., Juanita Darling, "Study Finds Geneva 
Convention Little Known, Seldom Obeyed," Los Angeles 
Times, November 5,1999. 
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sufficed in practice. 
Even the most 
ardent zealots of LOAC admit its rules are 
often unknown or, if known, ignored.31 A cursory 
review of the savage conflicts of the last twenty 
years in the Balkans, Sudan, Lebanon, Sierra 
Leone, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere 
proves that lamentable point. 
Most ominous, however, is the potential that 
some future adversaries may deliberately aban-
don LOAC adherence altogether - based on 
their notion of righteousness. In a recent book, 
two Chinese officers proposed a policy of "unre-
stricted war" for their nation. They complained 
"We are a weak country ... so do we need to 
fight according to your rules? No. War has 
rules, but those rules are set by the West .... 
But if you use those rules, then weak coun-
tries have no chance."32 Confronting an enemy 
disposed to use force wholly unrestricted by 
legal boundaries may someday present a harsh 
dilemma for the U.S. and other Western coun-
tries: suffer brutal losses - or even defeat -
or lash out in kind. The reality is that neither 
result is acceptable. What we must do is fash-
ion new rules now that - at a minimum-
honor the value of human life over property 
interests. Trying to do so in the midst of a 
future conflict would be gravely ill-conceived-
it must be accomplished in the reasoned atmos-
phere of peace, prosperity, and power. 
A new paradigm that plainly declares the 
perpetrators of violent, misogynic policies will 
32. As quoted in John Pomfret, "China Ponders New 
Rules of 'Unrestricted War'," Washington Post, August 
8,1999, p. AI. 
Strategic Review 
face a response so ferocious it will leave their 
nation physically and psychologically unrec-
ognizable, just might dampen the urges of 
even the most recalcitrant of peoples. 
Promulgating such a paradigm will be no easy 
task. Today, intellectual fashion makes feel-
good endeavors like outlawing landmines and 
other technologies of war the chic pastime for 
jet-setting internationalists. Such Nero-like 
preoccupations are incongruous in a world 
where machetes, knives, and other legacies 
of the Bronze Age inflict the worst horrors of 
war. These agreements do nothing to deter 
societies with insidious intents; for the fore-
seeable future only powerful forces of good 
can do that. Without question, the destruc-
tion of civilian property is hardly a cure-all, 
but it is another valuable tool for the forces of 
the moral against those of the amoral. The 
question is, how to implement the new para-
digm? 
Implementation could come in several ways. 
One method would be a revolutionary re-inter-
pretation of "military objective" so as to de-link 
the now-required nexus to a contribution to a 
specific military action, and to explicitly 
include those civilian objects whose loss weak-
ens the nation's collective will to continue the 
conflict. A second approach would be to rein-
vigorate and expand the concept of belligerent 
"reprisal." Simply stated, reprisals are acts 
otherwise prohibited that become permissi-
ble when a belligerent in bello engages in ille-
gal conduct. The victim state (or those act-
ing for it) is allowed to do things usually for-
bidden in order to end the unlawful acts being 
perpetuated upon it. True, to fully achieve 
the purpose of coercing societal change, the 
classic conception of belligerent reprisal may 
need expansion. But a fj.rst step - and one 
33. See Article 54, 1977 Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Summer 2000 
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long overdue - would be to remove the cur-
rent LOAC limitations that prohibit virtu-
ally all reprisals against civilian objects under 
just about every circumstance. 33 
What may impede the adoption of a new 
paradigm is a distorted view of egalitarian-
ism that makes it hard to accept that evil 
beliefs could permeate whole peoples. John 
Leo wrote that students at some colleges are, 
for example, "unwilling to oppose large moral 
horrors, including human sacrifice, ethnic 
cleansing, and slavery because they think no 
one has the right to criticize the moral views of 
another group or culture."34 To those similarly 
disposed, it is easy to obfuscate issues by assert-
ing complexity after complexity, subtlety after 
subtlety, legalism after legalism. But to the 
victims of Serb savagery - the Muslim woman 
being raped, the child being orphaned by the 
murder of his parents, the elderly refugee dying 
on a lonely road far from home - adjudging 
good and evil is a sadly easy task. We must 
not hesitate to demonize the demons. 
When societies propagate evil, democracies 
must be prepared to visit upon them force so 
staggering it will produce fundamental change. 
The force needed to do so - whether deliv-
ered via traditional kinetic bombing or imposed 
by way of a newly developed cyber-technique -
is not symbolic or incrementally administered, 
but rather massive, relentless, and profoundly 
shattering. If the widespread destruction of 
property serves the purpose of remaking a 
society that needs remaking, then interna-
tional law and ethical norms must yield to 
allow it. If fretting about the sanctity of adver-
saries' bank accounts prevents us from tak-
ing action that might help preserve the sanc-
tity of their victims' lives, then our priorities 
need re-ordering. 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977. 
34. John Leo, ''A No-Fault Holocaust," Us. News & World 
Report, July 21, 1997, p. 14. 
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